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Currently, the central banks of European nations with market 
economies have the primary statutory objective of achieving and 
maintaining price stability. The Czech, Hungarian and Polish national 
banks have already introduced inflation targeting, because these countries 
are European Union membership candidates, but they did not introduce the 
euro after their EU accession in 2004, despite it being a future obligation 
for them. These Central-East European countries have a unique style of 
capitalism, characterised by underdeveloped capital markets, poor savings 
accumulation and over-concentrated banking systems (Farkas 2011), 
resulting in substantial capital imports that accelerated the domestic credit 
booms in the pre-crisis era (Kovács 2009, Árvai et al. 2009).  
This paper aims to analyse the liquidity sensible environment that has 
defined the range of monetary policy decisions in the selected Central-East 
European member states over the last decade, using bond and currency 
markets as indicators and stock markets as control variables. First, it is 
necessary to define the monetary policy frameworks of these states and 
describe the expected potential impacts of these policies on, and 
assumptions regarding, capital markets. Second, it is necessary to analyse 
how these expectations measured against the experiences of the countries 
over the last decade. This study applies a method for examining the 
efficiency of capital markets and identifies different forms of collective 
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behaviours, such as contagion, divergence or interdependence; these 
phenomena influence the range of available monetary policy decisions.  
Following these results, it is necessary to evaluate how inflation 
targeting supports future euro adoption by answering these questions: 
 
1. Is there any convergence between the capital markets of the euro 
zone and the selected countries, as required by the Maastricht 
criteria1? 
2. Are the national banks in the selected countries able to address 
financial market crises alone? 
2. Theoretical background 
This chapter summarises the frameworks, expectations and 
assumptions regarding capital markets and their interactions with inflation-
targeting monetary policies, before defining the different forms of 
collective behaviours in capital markets. 
2.1. Capital markets and inflation-targeting frameworks 
Inflation-targeting monetary policy could be defined as a monetary 
framework that comprises the following four properties: (1) the goal of 
price stability, (2) an announced numerical or sequential inflation target 
within a given time period, (3) inflation-forecast targeting (Svenson 1997), 
and (4) high levels of transparency and accountability (Hamori and 
Hamori 2010). O’Sullivan and Tomljankovich (2012) summarise the 
primary benefits attributed to this approach in the literature as follows: 
substantial declines in inflation and output growth volatility in emerging 
economies reduces the probability of banking crises and noise in bond 
markets. The expected noise reduction became significant in light of an 
article by Bean et al. (2010), which summarises the presumptions of the 
pre-crisis monetary policy for both the US Federal Reserve System (FED) 
and the European Central Bank (ECB) – where the assumption of market 
efficiency as a working approximation for equity and credit markets and 
where price and financial stability are assumed to be mutually dependent. 
The assumption of market efficiency and the expected reduction of 
noise in bond markets are connected to the first question of this study. The 
                                                          
1 Focusing on the 4th and 5th criteria, which call for long-term interest rates of no 
more than two percentage points above the rate in the three EU countries with the 
lowest inflation over the previous year, and that a national currency's exchange rate 
remain within certain pre-set margins for two years. 
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Maastricht-type convergence of capital markets could be temporary or at 
least biased when they can be described by a complex capital market 
model, involving the phenomenon of collective behaviour on extreme 
days. To test these phenomena, this study focuses on the 3-month and 
10-year maturities of bond and currency market developments and on the 
stock market as a control variable between January 1 2002 and August 31 
2011 using daily closing values. Our objective is to explore the spill-over 
effects generated by the FED and ECB on the new EU member states that 
aspire to adopt the euro. 
Bonanno et al. (2001) defined three statistical consequences of 
complexity in financial markets: first, time series have short and long 
range memories and only asymptotic stationarity; second, their sectoral 
intraday cross-correlations are high; and third, they demonstrate collective 
market behaviours during extreme market events. The contagion, 
divergence and interdependence terms are consistent with the latter two 
consequences, with interdependence ruling out any significant changes in 
the common movement between markets, contagion being important under 
a significant increase in cross market correlation and divergence being 
important under a decrease in cross market correlation. 
Contagions can be broadly defined as the cross-country transmission of 
shocks or general cross-country spill-over effects, which do not need to be 
related to crises. This paper uses the World Bank’s very restrictive 
definition2 of contagions, as cross-country correlations that increase during 
“crisis periods” relative to correlations during “tranquil periods”. 
Interdependence can be described as a situation where the difference 
between correlations under extreme and normal conditions is insignificant. 
Definition: Contagion (1) occurs between jk mm  markets when the 
jmkmρ  cross-market correlation becomes significantly higher due to a 
shock derived from one market ( m xnr / ) spreading to others or as a result of 
other external factors (Forbes and Rigobon 2002; Campbell et al. 2002; 







xnr ρρ <→≠ 0/ ,  (1) 
                                                          
2 Forbes and Rigobon (2002) used the World Bank’s (2012) definition as well. 
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Definition: Interdependence (2) occurs between jk mm  markets when 
the jmkmρ  cross-market correlation is not significantly different, but the 







xnr ρρ ≈→≠ 0/  (2) 
 
Definition: Divergence (3) occurs between jk mm  markets when the 
jmkmρ  cross-market correlation becomes significantly lower due to a 
shock derived from one market ( m xnr / ) spreading to others or as a result of 







xnr ρρ >→≠ 0/  (3) 
 
There could be a number of reasons behind the collective behaviour 
phenomenon, for example changes in market mood, herding, trade 
relations3, credit channels or political connections. However, according to 
Jentsch et al. (2006), there is a more general reason for collective 
behaviour that derives from the dynamic properties of extreme events, as 
extreme events are nested functions of scale-free complex networks. The 
efficient market hypothesis is consistent with an Erdős and Rényi (1960) 
random graph or a competitive market model, but there is a more 
oligopolistic model of a scale-free network that has been developed by 
Barabási and Albert (1999). Networks among economic actors and 
financial markets or ordinary enterprises follow this model, according to 
Berlinger et al. (2011), Benedek et al. (2007), Lublóy (2005) and Vitali et 
al. (2011). Financial systems are primarily interconnected through the 
interbank lending market, as the results of Kovács (2009) and Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS 2011) suggest. Therefore, the vulnerability of 
a country will not depend on macroeconomic fundamentals or the general 
soundness of the individual banking systems alone, but will be affected by 
the maturity structure of foreign claims and the financial relationships 
between home and host institutions, as Árvai et al. (2009) suggests. 
                                                          
3 The euro zone accounted for 52% of Hungarian exports and 55% of its imports in 
2011 (KSH 2012); the euro zone accounted for 47% and 60% of Polish imports 
and exports in 2010 (GUS 2011, 112), while the corresponding figures for the 
Czech Republic were 53% and 67% (CZSO 2011). 
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2.2 The difference between the autonomy  
and independence of monetary policy 
 
The possibility of barriers between capital markets raises a second 
question and obviously suggests a more intensive collaboration between 
the ECB and non-euro-area member states to support official liquidity and 
maintain the transmission mechanism. In optimal circumstances, a credible 
and independent central bank would be able to establish a path for short-
term interest rates to anchor expectations about future policy rates to 
influence longer term interest rates (BoE 2000). For example, between 
September 2008 and February 2010, the reduction in the ECB’s short term 
interest rates generally affected the three month Euro Interbank Offered 
Rate (EURIBOR) and, in parallel, most bank interest rates on loans for 
housing and consumption also declined (ECB 2010). Based on the deep 
economic relationships between the countries in this analysis and the euro 
zone, the monetary policy environments are already interconnected, with 
the potential consequence of narrowing the range of decisions available. 
The autonomy of monetary policy was defined by Plümper and Troeger 
(2008) and Obstfeld et al. (2005) as the ability of central banks to set 
prime rates according to macroeconomic conditions, or as the independence 
from the monetary policies in the key currency areas. This ability is 
reduced by the degree of monetary interdependence, which is based on 
trade relationships and cross-border production chains. Therefore, a 
floating exchange rate regime and free movement of capital does not 
necessary imply full monetary autonomy as the classic notion of the 
impossible trilemma would suggest. Global liquidity is able to limit this 
autonomy by increasing the vulnerabilities of a financial system through 
substantial mismatches across currencies, maturities and countries, while 
the supply of global liquidity stems from one or more “core countries” 
(BIS 2011). Therefore, the BIS recommends wider and more targeted 
interventions on the national (monetary liquidity) and international (IMF 
and other regional stabilisation funds) levels (referred to as “official 
liquidity”) in domestic and foreign currencies when private funding or 
market liquidity contracts suddenly. 
Uneven monetary autonomy and central bank independence are not 
contradictory because this “independence” only refers to its domestic 
institutional meaning under current law4, where only the frameworks for 
                                                          
4 ECB: article 130 of the Treaty on European Union; Act No. 6/1993 Coll. on the 
Czech National Bank, Article 1 and 6; Act CCVIII of 2011 on the Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank – Hungarian National Bank, Article 1; The Act on the National Bank of 
Poland of 29 August 1997, Article 56 
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central bank activities are defined by the law, instead of its operations. The 
turbulence in private liquidity and the cross-border lending and ownership 
in the banking sector suggest more intensive collaborations between 
EU-27 central banks and financial authorities5 within and outside the euro 
zone. The next chapter briefly summarises the primary interactions among 
the ECB, the FED and the selected central banks with a focus on the 
patterns of pre-crisis and crisis collaborations. 
3. Monetary policy decisions by the ECB and the FED 
This paper defines two periods according to the ECB’s and FED’s 
interest rate decisions: “period A” covers the era of increasing and 
consistently high interest rates, while “period B” is a period of 
expansionary monetary policy with decreased interest rates on the short 
end of the yield curve and increasing yields on the long end. This chapter 
briefly summarises the main events of these periods, focusing mainly on 
the relationships between the ECB and the central banks (Czech National 
Bank – CNB, Hungarian National Bank – MNB, Polish National Bank – 
NPB) of the selected countries, especially in the year 2008. 
3.1 Period “A” 
A cautious monetary tightening characterised both ECB and FED 
monetary policy during the reconstruction phase after the dot-com bubble 
– the FED began to cautiously increase its primary credit interest rate from 
2% to 6.25% between June 30, 2004 and August 17, 2007. This 42 month 
period was longer than the corresponding 18 month period when the ECB 
increased its main refinancing rate from 2% to 4% between December 6 
2005 and June 13 2007. This tightening was triggered by the general 
increase of raw material, food and energy prices (MNB 2008), despite the 
emerging concerns regarding the sustainability of the housing sector. The 
FED kept interest rates high until August 17 2007, while the ECB waited 
until July 9 2008 and increased its interest rates to 4.25% until October 14 
2008. This stable period was characterised by emerging risk management 
and securitisation issues.  
                                                          
5 Despite the different institutional environments, for example there have been 
supreme financial supervision authorities in Hungary and Poland since 1999 and 
2006, while in the Czech Republic it has been part of the central bank since 1993. 
(Act No. 6/1993 Coll., on the Czech National Bank; Hungary: law 124 in 1999; 
Poland: Act on Financial Market Supervision of 2006, No. 157, item 1119). 
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The ECB’s measures to manage money market turbulence during the 
period from January to September 2008 can be grouped under three 
headings (ECB 2009): 
 
1. The liquidity provision used earlier in the maintenance period to 
fulfil counterparties’ reserve requirements.  
2. Supplementary longer-term (3 and 6 month) refinancing 
operations occurring since July 2007. 
3. Operations in conjunction with the US dollar Term Auction 
Facility: in 2007, the ECB established a reciprocal currency 
arrangement (swap line) with the Federal Reserve System – the 
Eurosystem provided funding in US dollars received via this 
28-day and, later, 3-month swap line to its counterparts against 
collateral eligible for Eurosystem credit operations. 
 
The intensification of the global financial crisis brought challenges for 
monetary policy in the selected countries, which experienced liquidity 
constraints in their interbank markets and tensions in their foreign 
exchange markets. Central bank responses varied depending on the 
economic conditions and monetary policy framework in place, for 
example ERM II participants adopted monetary policy measures that 
frequently mirrored moves by the ECB. However, central banks with 
inflation targets that did not participate in ERM II tightened their monetary 
policy stances at the beginning of 2008, with the aim of containing 
inflationary pressures stemming in large part from food and energy price 
increases and wage growth. In the first three quarters of 2008, the MNB 
and PNB each increased their main policy rates by a total of 100 basis 
points in several steps, while the CNB increased its main policy rate only 
once, by 25 basis points in February, a move that was reversed in August. 
The selected non-euro-area member states did not participate in ERM II in 
2008, and their currencies appreciated and reached record levels against 
the euro in the first half of the year. In February 2008, Hungary replaced 
its exchange rate band for the euro with a free-floating exchange ratio 
reach its inflation target, thereby fulfilling the nominal Maastricht criteria 
(MNB 2008). However, after the deepening of the financial crisis in 
September, global deleveraging and severe problems in the functioning of 
interbank markets worldwide resulted in a rapid and pronounced 
depreciation of the Polish zloty and the Hungarian forint (ECB 2009). 
As a result of the increasingly deepening crisis, a direct disinflationary 
effect emerged that affected demand and household consumption; this 
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trend was supported by the expansion of household foreign currency loans 
and redundancies in the labour market (MNB 2008). 
3.2 Period “B” 
Central banks had to operate under disrupted monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms: money market interest rates were largely 
affected by liquidity disturbances, caused by the lack of trust among 
market participants and significant declines in markets’ balances, due to 
price decreases and problems with asset valuation (NBP 2009). 
Period “B” is characterised by monetary easing; however, period “B” 
did not occur simultaneously at the ECB and FED (as shown by their 
policy rates): the FED reduced the prime rate between August 17 2007 and 
December 17 2008 until it reached 0.5%, while the ECB only reacted after 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The late reaction on the part of the ECB 
seems reasonable due to its previous liquidity enhancement measures and 
the significant increase in inflation, resulting from a price surge in the 
global agricultural and energy commodity markets in 2007 and the first 
half of 2008. Global inflationary pressures only eased in the second half of 
2008; however, at the same time, the previously visible appreciation trend 
of the Central-East European (CEE) currencies was inverted due to 
growing risk aversion and the ensuing capital outflows from emerging 
markets (NBP 2009). 
In the second half of 2008, the ECB’s main refinancing rate declined 
from 4.25% to 1% until May 2009, and it tightened the interest rate 
channels from 200 basis points to 100 bps to reduce interbank market 
volatility. The financial system recovered quickly, but the crisis spread to 
the European bond market, causing heterogeneous risk premiums between 
euro-area member states.  
The ECB took the following steps to enhance liquidity management 
from October to December 2008, as the Annual Report of the ECB (2009) 
describes: 
 
1. Fixed rate tenders with full allotment (all bids were satisfied), 
signing to market participants that the ECB was willing to supply 
as much liquidity as needed to avoid a liquidity crisis. 
2. A reduction of the corridor formed by the standing facility rates, 
i.e., the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility, from 
200 to 100 basis points, aiming to further ease banks’ liquidity 
management by offering less expensive central bank intermediation.  
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3. Supplementary longer-term refinancing operations: one for the 
length of the maintenance period, two with a maturity of three 
months, and one with a maturity of six months.  
4. Additional US dollar and Swiss franc-providing operations. 
Market liquidity in the foreign exchange swap market was 
unusually low due to increased stress and market segmentation, 
causing US dollar financing to become extremely difficult for 
institutions outside the United States. The Eurosystem further 
reinforced its provision of US dollar liquidity to Eurosystem 
counterparts by adding collateralised repo operations, fulfilling all 
bids at a fixed rate with overnight, 7-day, 28-day and 3-month 
maturities, in parallel with EUR/USD foreign exchange swaps.  
On 15 October, the Swiss National Bank and the ECB jointly 
announced measures to improve liquidity in short-term Swiss 
franc money markets, whereby the Eurosystem would provide its 
counterparts with Swiss franc financing via a swap line at a fixed 
price and with a maximum allotment amount and a 7-day or 3-
month maturity. 
The ECB did not undertake any foreign exchange operations 
in the currencies that participate in ERM II.  
5. Expansion of the collateral list. 
 
In response to the tensions that developed in financial markets in late 
October and November 2008, there was a joint international financial 
support programme for Hungary to ease the downward pressure on the 
forint and other currencies in the region. However, the deteriorating 
economic outlook and external vulnerabilities, combined with credit rating 
downgrades for Hungary in October and November, resulted in a further 
sharp depreciation of the zloty, the forint and the koruna (ECB 2009). On 
21–22 October, the exchange rate of the forint was subject to significant 
devaluation pressure in excess of that justified by macroeconomic 
fundamentals, causing an increase in the base rate of 300 basis points to 
maintain the stability of the financial intermediary system, contain a 
further strengthening of capital outflows and devaluation expectations and 
make speculation against the forint more expensive (MNB 2008). In 
October and November 2008, the ECB signed agreements to provide euro 
liquidity to the Hungarian and Polish national banks to improve euro 
liquidity in their respective domestic financial markets via repurchase 
agreements worth up to 5 and 10 billion euro (ECB 2009).  
Hungary was able to meet its external obligations (97% of GDP at the 
end of 2007) under these extreme market circumstances due to the 
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17-month Stand-By Arrangement provided by the IMF (€12.3 billion), 
ECB (€6.5 billion) and World Bank (€1 billion) under the Fund's fast-track 
Emergency Financing Mechanism procedures (IMF 2008). This programme 
had two key objectives: to reduce the government's debt-financing needs 
and maintain the liquidity and capital adequacy in the banking system. 
This joint credit line caused a 57% increase in the balance sheet of the 
Hungarian National Bank (MNB). The MNB took several steps to improve 
the distribution of interbank forint and FX liquidity and maintain the 
functionality of domestic financial markets; FX liquidity was improved 
through two-way O/N FX swap quick tenders and an overnight FX swap 
standing facility from the €5 billion credit line provided by the ECB. 
Forint liquidity was enhanced through a reduced reserve ratio, two-week, 
fixed-rate, and weekly collateralised loan tenders, six-month, variable-rate 
collateralised loan tenders, as well as secondary market government 
securities purchases (MNB 2008). The range of eligible collateral was also 
expanded and made more similar to the set of instruments applied by the 
ECB. 
Polish commercial banks also suffered from limited access to financing 
currency positions due to the turmoil in international financial markets. 
Therefore, the Polish National Bank introduced the so-called Confidence 
Pact in October 2008 to (1) enable banks to obtain financing in the zloty 
with 7-day and 3-month maturity repo transactions, (2) enable banks to 
obtain foreign currency financing through FX swaps (USD/PLN, EUR/PLN 
and CHF/PLN after November) with 7-day and 3-month maturities, and 
(3) extend the list of securities that were acceptable in transactions with 
the NBP (NBP 2009). A $20.6 billion IMF Flexible Credit Line was 
provided for Poland in May 2009 for a one year period, but it was not used 
(IMF 2009, NBP 2010).  
The Czech National Bank also applied reverse 2-week repos and 
foreign exchange swaps (3-month CZK/EUR) as extraordinary operations 
to increase liquidity in the secondary government bond market and other 
channels for banks. However, Czech domestic short-term interest rates 
were lower than the corresponding rates in the euro-area for most of 2008, 
as was the case in the previous three years, until euro interest rates fell 
sharply below Czech rates in the second half of the year. The Czech 
Republic adopted the role of a “safe haven” in the first half of 2008, but a 
rapid outflow of short-term investments followed (CNB 2009). 
Inflationary pressure eased due to declines in commodity prices; 
therefore, most central banks with inflation targets (the Bank of England 
and The Swedish National Bank) decreased their policy interest rates in 
the fourth quarter of 2008 in response to the weakening economic outlook 
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and the intensification of the global financial crisis. However, the Czech, 
Hungarian and Polish national banks were only able to decrease their 
policy rates in November and December, after gaining liquidity through 
official channels in October. 
The experiences of the liquidity disruptions in 2008 are reflected in 
both the concepts of the new capital and liquidity adequacy regulations in 
Basel III (Ács 2011) and the Global liquidity – concept, measurement and 
policy implications report of the BIS (2011). The latter clearly states that 
the role of official liquidity is inevitable when private (market and 
funding) liquidity declines to an extreme level: central banks are able to 
provide liquidity in domestic currency, however foreign currency can only 
be provided through foreign exchange reserves, swap lines between central 
banks, or dedicated facilities such as IMF programmes. 
In summary, this section indicates that foreign exchange markets and 
foreign currency liquidity play fundamental roles in the selected countries 
and indirectly and directly affect the government bond market. A 
Maastricht-type convergence seems to have disappeared between capital 
markets during the extreme days of 2008, underscoring the relevance of 
the first research question. The swap lines and collaboration between 
central banks proved to be essential (including on the level of FED-ECB 
relations, not only between ECB and CNB-MNB-PNB), but it is necessary 
to study the differences between ordinary and extraordinary periods in 
capital markets – focusing on the remarkable forms of collective 
behaviour. 
4. Methodology 
To demonstrate the existence of collective behaviours between markets 
on extreme trading days, it is first necessary to reject the efficiency of the 
selected markets. To meet the efficiency requirements put forth by 
Fama (1970), markets have to behave as a random walk describes them –
returns should be normally distributed (Jarque-Berra test), without 
autocorrelation (Ljung-Box test) or heteroscedasticity (ARCH LM test), 
and should be stationery (ADF test) (Wong and Li 2010, Tsay 2005, 
Lütkepohl 2004). The rejection of market efficiency allows us to estimate 
contagions through the use of dynamic conditional correlation after ruling 
out heteroscedasticity with GARCH-models, following Cappiello et al. 
(2006).  
Time series are generally biased by autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
because of the fat tails of the return distributions and volatility clustering. 
The different versions of Bollerslev’s (1986) Generalised Autoregression 
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and Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models are widely used methods to 
provide homoscedastic, standardised residuals. The Asymmetric Power 
GARCH (APARCH)6 model (4) developed by Ding et al. (1993) may be 
the most powerful tool to address the heteroscedasticity bias that results 












δδδ σβεγεωσ , (4) 
 
where ω  is a constant term, α denotes the impact of news, 11 <<− iγ  is 
responsible for the asymmetry function, β  is the level of volatility 
persistence, and 0>δ  provides nonlinearity. The parameters of APARCH 
have to be defined: “ p ” and “ q ” determine the lag numbers of the 
residuals and volatility, while “ o ” is a non-negative scalar integer 
representing the number of asymmetric innovations. A further advantage 
of the APARCH model is its flexibility – it is simple to convert it to the 
GJR GARCH and TARCH models and the basic GARCH form. The lag 
length was optimised on a 1-to-4 scale and selected according to the 
estimation’s Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). 
As Forbes and Rigobon (2002) suggest, ordinary cross-correlation is 
not a suitable tool for specifying the common movement of markets 
because of heteroscedasticity. Cointegration is also ruled out because it is 
better to analyse long-term processes; hence, BEKK-GARCH or 
DCC-GARCH could be adequate solutions following the APARCH step.  
This study applies DCC-GARCH7, following Engle (2002), to analyse 
the daily common movements of the selected markets. Cross-market 
correlation is compared using the Ansari-Bradley test because this 
variance test is not based on the assumption of a normal distribution – as is 
the case for the widely used t-test. After the identification of common 
market movements, it is necessary to separate them on the basis of the hub 
return’s extremity or normality. 
How can we separate the “extreme” and “ordinary”? Jentsch et al. 
(2006) defined extreme events8 by their impact and probability – hence, 
                                                          
6 The estimation based on the UCSD toolbox, developed by Kevin Sheppard: 
http://www.kevinsheppard.com/wiki/UCSD_GARCH 
7 The estimation based on the Oxford MFE toolbox, developed by Kevin 
Sheppard: http://www.kevinsheppard.com/wiki/MFE_Toolbox 
8 Definition: Extreme event (4) is a Wwx ∈  event for a W  stochastic variable 
with a nx ww >>  or nx ww <<  significantly higher impact than the expected in 
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we have to find a suitable threshold or milestone to form both groups. 
There are multiple solutions (see Campbell et al., 2002), but this study 
focus on the fatness of the tails; therefore, it is necessary to separate the 
empirical distribution by fitting a theoretical normal distribution to it. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to define extreme returns on the basis of the 
extreme event definition – that is, “shocks” were the product of the 
transition from the normal to the extreme return subset. 
Definition: Extreme return (5) is the extreme change of the jm  market 
on the fat tails of the jmr  return’s probability distribution. This event is 
related to the skewness of the distribution, while their probability and 
value differ starkly from the )(rE  expected. 
 
)(rErx >> or xrrE >>)(  where )(rExr pp <<  (5) 
 
Definition: Normal returns (6) fit well on the projected theoretical 
normal distribution – therefore, they are denoted in the study variable nr . 
Definition: Capital market shock (7) means the xnr /  transition of the 
return from the nr  normal subset to the xr  extreme subset. The 0/ ≠xnr  
existence of this transition defines both subsets (6), while the totally 
















xn rrr =→= 0/ . (7) 
 
The entire time series can be divided (8) into extreme and normal 
subsets according to the above definitions: 
 
                                                                                                                         
a limited time and space with a )()( nx wpwp <<  significantly lower probability 
than the expected, providing a uniqueness (Jentsch et al. 2006). 
































where iempiricalr ,  is the i th element of the empirical distribution and the 
inormalltheoreticar ,  denotes the projected normal distribution, lki << . 
Relying on the definition of QQ plots by Deutsch (2002, 690–691), the 













1 φφ  for all Ti < , therefore,  
in Xr 22 σμ +≈ ,   
ix Xr 22 σμ +>
+ ,  
ix Xr 22 σμ +<
− , (9) 
 
where iX  denotes the theoretical empirical standard normal distribution, 
which is represented in the QQ plot by a line with iX22 σμ +  slope. 
Contagions, divergences and interdependences initiated by one 
market’s extreme days have to be detected for 10 inter-market correlations 
(6 for currencies). First, it is necessary to decide between interdependence 
(nonsignificant changes in correlations) and significant correlation 
changes (such as divergence and contagion) – this could be expressed by 























s , N  denotes the 
number of involved market pairs. Contagions are characterised by 
significantly higher correlations and divergences are characterised by 
significantly lower correlations according to the definitions (11). To select 
between these two forms, the following algorithm was used: 
 








































































































Thus the contagion was expressed by weighting against the entire set 




Fig. 9-1 Mapping the difference between contagion and interdependence 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
This approach (Figure 9-1) regards market developments in terms of 
whether they would be signs of shock or contagion. Therefore, a 
contagiousness ranking could be defined between the three CEE, US and 
euro zone markets, where markets could be scored according to the 
number of correlations divided into significantly different parts, and the 
extreme correlation should be higher on average. The results can be easily 
visualised in the following way: the “x” axis depicts the rate of 
significantly different and non-different correlations, while the “y” axis 
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depicts the number of observable correlations, where extreme values are 
higher than normal. 
Although the need for monetary collaboration became obvious in light 
of the events of 2008, it was necessary to define the patterns that require 
monetary policy to be conducted with caution. The above methodology 
can be used not only to test for market efficiency (one of the presumptions 
of pre-crisis monetary policy), but we are also able to separate the days 
when this efficiency was most biased (e.g., trading days with extreme 
returns), as well as the dynamics of common market movements and 
collective behaviour patterns. 
5. Results 
Our results are structured in the following manner: after the rejection 
of the classic form of market efficiency, the patterns of extreme price 
developments and common movements will be analysed. The impacts of 
the FED and ECB’s monetary policies on the sample countries will be 
analysed using two event windows on the basis of the increasing and 
decreasing phases of these two important central banks’ main refinancing 
rates.  
According to the results in Table 9-1, the lack of a normal distribution 
and the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of the time series ruled out 
the classical form of market efficiency. These properties suggest volatility 
clustering and more frequent extreme jumps in the first differentials of 
bond market yields, currency rates and stock market indices. 
High kurtosis (exceeding the level of 3) could be interpreted as a clear 
sign of fat tailness and extreme changes, which occurs with enormous 
magnitude in the bond markets – in contrast to the stock and currency 
markets with their moderate kurtoses. This result is remarkable, 
considering that changes in the 3-month yield are primarily affected by 
monetary policy and changes in international liquidity, while the 
unregulated stock markets and free-floating currencies seemed to be 
smoother. The observed heteroscedasticity underlines the appropriateness 
of employing various GARCH models before estimating the correlations. 
As the results in Table 9-2 suggest, heteroscedasticity was ruled out in 
all of the cases – consequently, bond markets required the highest lag 
number and the application of the developed GARCH model, while the 
stock and currency markets were less difficult. Volatility persistence 
seemed to be an important factor as the close-to-one level of the β  
coefficient suggests. Market participants and central banks were forced to 
operate in a market where volatility was self-enhancing.  
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Patterns of the common market movements differ between market 
types. Figures 9-2 to 9-5 illustrate the dynamic conditional correlation 
fluctuations. 
 






US 3M 0.23 70.0669 0.001 -55.462 * -1.9416 0 0
EURO 3M -0.02 42.0711 0.001 -51.2232 * -1.9416 0 0.2245 ***
HU 3M 1.3047 85.5834 0.001 -50.2077 * -1.9416 0 0.8346 ***
CZ 3M -3.9396 63.4792 0.001 -46.9896 * -1.9416 0.846 ** 0.0033
PL 3M -0.7997 37.5076 0.001 -44.1657 * -1.9416 0.0334 0
US 10Y -0.2763 8.4496 0.001 -52.3948 * -1.9416 0 0.0188
EURO 10Y 0.0321 4.96 0.001 -46.9331 * -1.9416 0 0.0016
HU 10Y 0.3541 14.6869 0.001 -47.6824 * -1.9416 0 0.0171
CZ 10Y -1.6999 63.9912 0.001 -49.1197 * -1.9416 0 0.3756 ***
PL 10Y 0.6234 16.2843 0.001 -42.2279 * -1.9416 0 0
DJI 0.1068 12.2829 0.001 -55.5017 * -1.9416 0 0
DAX 0.107 8.2694 0.001 -52.2590 * -1.9416 0 0.0276
BUX -0.093 9.9225 0.001 -47.6622 * -1.9416 0 0.0178
PX -0.5618 17.8663 0.001 -46.4961 * -1.9416 0 0.0003
WIG -0.2971 6.2382 0.001 -46.3625 * -1.9416 0 0.0002
EUR/USD -0.1148 5.2043 0.001 -49.7133 * -1.9416 0 0.8173 ***
HUF/USD -0.476 7.275 0.001 -50.6851 * -1.9416 0 0.464 ***
CZK/USD -0.2709 5,5867 0.001 -48.0621 * -1.9416 0 0.0573 ***
PLN/USD -0.1601 8.5734 0.001 -50.0457 * -1.9416 0 0.9433 ***
p p
*: stationary time series; **: homoscedasticity; ***: lack of autocorrelation
Analysed markets Skewness Kurtosis
Stationarity Heteroscedasticity Autocorrelation
(ADF-test) 1 lag (ARCH-LM ) 2 lag (Ljung-Box) 6 lag
t statistic
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Fig. 9-2 Dynamic conditional correlation between 3-month yields 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Three-month yields exhibit uncorrelated fluctuation, suggesting limited 
spill-over effects between these maturities in the sample countries. As this 
is the most liquid maturity and is targeted by monetary policy operations, 
it is difficult to find any evidence of interdependence or time-variance.  
The appearance of the crisis after 2007 had more serious impacts on 
the 10-year yields, as Figure 9-3 presents. The pre-crisis weak correlation 
was neutralised by the crisis, which is our first piece of evidence to prove 
Bearce’s (2002) divergence phenomenon. This result is considerable on 
the basis of the bond market convergence requirements in the Maastricht 
criteria – Central-East European countries’ euro adoption was weakly 
priced in the pre-crisis era and totally ruled out during the crisis. 
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Fig. 9-3 Dynamic conditional correlation between 10-year yields 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
There was a correlation between stock markets, as Figure 9-4 suggests. 
Stronger economic ties between German and emerging European countries 
implied high correlation compared to the weaker correlation between the 
US and the other markets in the sample. The strength of the common 
movement increased dramatically in the second half of the decade – thus, 
it was already high before the crisis appeared; which is similar to the 
results obtained by Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) and Goetzman et al. 
(2005). 
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Fig. 9-4 Dynamic conditional correlation between stock markets 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Contrary to the observed weak 10-year bond market convergence, the 
selected currencies exhibit strong correlation (see Figure 9-5), as shown by 
Stávárek (2009) and Babetskaia-Kukharchuk et al. (2008). This strong 
common movement is surrounded by several declines, suggesting there are 




Fig. 9-5 Dynamic conditional correlation between currency pairs 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































According to these results, we are able make the following statements: 
3-month yields and currency rates fluctuated around well-defined 
correlation levels, while the 10-year yields had a decreasing trend and 
stock markets had an increasing trend approaching the crisis era. 
After the identification of the correlation curves and outliers, it is 
necessary to define “normal” and “extreme” in the sample markets days. 
Trading days with extreme fluctuations were placed in the “extreme 
subset”, as they do not fit the theoretical normal distribution in both of the 
tails of the empirical distribution (Table 9-3). These extreme days met the 
definition of extreme events: their mass is insignificant in the entire 
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sample, but they occur in the tails with low probability and high values. 
The validity of this method was verified by comparing the kurtosis of the 
entire sample to the subset of “normal” or ordinary days – the observed 
convergence to 3 was quite impressive.  
Extreme jumps were distributed almost symmetrically in the case of 
the 3M market, while the first extreme return had the highest magnitude. 
Extreme yield increases characterised the 10Y market; this asymmetry is 
underlined not only by the number of days but also by the smaller first 
extreme return. Asymmetry characterised both the stock and currency 
markets on their negative side – the increased mass of extreme drops is 
clear in the case of the stock indices, but the currencies were characterised 
by extreme days primarily after the strength of the currencies had 
improved substantially. 
After the introduction of time-varying correlation patterns and extreme 
change properties, it is necessary to make a brief comparison between 
“subsample A” (increases in the main refinance rates of the ECB and FED) 
and “subsample B” (decreasing interest rate period) for all of the markets. 
Considering the shorter period of the ECB refinancing-rate changes – a 
34 month increase and 36 month decrease compared to the FED’s 42 and 
47 months – there are two common phenomena (Table 9-4). First, the 
3-month yields generally declined when the central banks reduced the 
main refinancing rates – implying some type of implicit spill-over effect 
between monetary policies. However the decline in 10-year yields was not 
a broad success, Central-East European national banks had to contend with 
increasing long term yields in contrast to the general decline in the euro 
zone and the US. The shapes of the yield curves became steeper in the 
entire sample, but they were the sharpest in the centre. A maturity 
transformation in a banking system requires this positive shape of the 10Y-
3M spread under constant price level expectations. All of the currencies 
appreciated against the USD with increased volatility in the interval “B”, 
while the stock indices were generally devalued according to ECB’s 
monetary decisions – the FED windows produced a different outcome. 
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Table 9-4 Market differences under increasing and decreasing 
interest rates 
 
US EUR HU CZ PL US EUR HU CZ PL
mean "A" 3.809897181 3.5003 7.5218 3.0487 4.8834 3.834701958 2.6703 7.6137 2.3492 4.9094
variance "A" 2.061284042 0.361 0.7361 0.5813 0.8121 1.521848281 0.519 2.2822 0.1307 0.9910
mean "B" 0.125510778 0.7093 6.9252 1.8194 4.2992 0.761449082 1.6498 7.2524 2.4266 4.7550
variance "B" 0.012027703 0.2983 3.5459 0.7010 0.5364 1.325980386 2.3883 2.8827 1.4100 0.9820
mean "A" 4.443556107 4.0302 7.2212 4.2229 5.5631 4.533348103 3.7753 7.0318 3.9982 5.5258
variance "A" 0.23584287 0.0954 0.3768 0.2221 0.1818 0.109197037 0.1401 0.4347 0.3113 0.4810
mean "B" 3.216767531 3.0693 8.0788 4.2510 6.0088 3.434390821 3.3910 7.9372 4.3725 5.9969
variance "B" 0.1834048 0.1264 1.6655 0.2821 0.0931 0.27888403 0.3550 1.3788 0.2493 0.0862
mean "A" 0.633658926 0.5298 -0.3007 1.1743 0.6798 0.698646144 1.1051 -0.5818 1.6490 0.6164
variance "A" 1.044591812 0.1770 0.4704 0.1673 0.3369 1.017479763 0.3019 1.1300 0.1617 0.4262
mean "B" 3.091256753 2.3600 1.1537 2.4316 1.7095 2.672941739 1.7412 0.6848 1.9459 1.2418
variance "B" 0.180085116 0.2867 0.9540 0.5249 0.5545 0.750074321 1.1571 1.2308 0.9578 0.9718
mean "A" 1.3660 0.0054 0.0506 0.3692 1.2641 0.0050 0.0430 0.3142
variance "A" 0.0138 0.0000 0.0001 0.0028 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007
mean "B" 1.3664 0.0050 0.0537 0.3352 1.4013 0.0053 0.0550 0.3609
variance "B" 0.0052 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0081 0.0000 0.0000 0.0025
mean "A" 12164 6632 23516 1588 48793 11264 5473 20459 1366 38962





central bank ECB FED
markets
3M
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Dividing our samples according to the interest rate decisions of the 
ECB and FED was useful to separate the pre-crisis and crisis eras and to 
evaluate possible spill-overs to the emerging European sample, but it is 
difficult to identify any difference between the two approaches. 
The increasing and decreasing periods defined by the FED’s main 
refinancing rate seemed a more appropriate tool to divide the sample 
markets’ common movements into two significantly different components 
– at least 67% of the market pairs had significantly different correlations in 
this case (Table 9-5). This result is remarkable because 3M markets 
seemed to be uncorrelated before the crisis in addition to the consistently 
high common movements in the currency market. The results concerning 
the FED’s leadership role could be biased by the different length of the 
two intervals. 
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Table 9-5 Significant differences in the common movement of the sample 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
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Therefore, it is necessary to study how the common movements differ 
under the extreme days defined by US and euro-area benchmarks for the 
entire sample or the upper subsets. Figure 9-6 demonstrates that it is 
difficult to define collective behaviours during extreme events. The 
correlation of sample currencies during the strong appreciation of the euro 
indicated divergence, meaning a weaker correlation as opposed to the 
general strong one. However, contagions were identified using the shorter 
ECB subsets, while the broader FED subsets indicated only interdependence. 
3M markets generally exhibit interdependence, as do those of the 10Y, 
where only the entire sample-based EUR10Y indicated divergence, which 
means that weak correlations occur when the yield curve decreases 
substantially, e.g. during monetary expansion, ruling out the possibility of 
liquidity providing monetary spill-overs between central and emerging 
countries. During severe decline in the stock markets, only the entire-
sample based on the Dow Jones Industrial Average was able to identify 
contagions – DAX and various subsets indicated only interdependence. 
The widely accepted hypothesis of trade-relation-based common 
movements was rejected because of this result and because the stock 
markets are not consistently interconnected. 
Figure 9-7 presents divergences between currencies when the euro 
depreciated substantially against the USD according to the ECB subsets; 
sample currencies with weakened correlations are able to depreciate more 
extensively or remain stable. The 3M markets remained interdependent, 
but the US10Y market in the entire subset was able to indicate divergence 
when it increased substantially, meaning loosening common movements 
under monetary tightening and scarce liquidity. The entire sample based 
Dow Jones Industrial Average remained able to identify contagions only 
when the index increased substantially, and “A” periods present a nearly 
identical picture. 
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Fig. 9-6 Map of possible contagions, divergence and interdependence, comparing 
ordinary and negative extreme changes 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Fig. 9-7 Map of possible contagions, divergence and interdependence, comparing 
ordinary and positive extreme changes 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
These results suggest that thinking of collective behaviour is necessary: 
cross market-correlation is able to change on the days when one market 
undergoes extreme changes, but it is difficult to identify such differences 
in subsets, such as those representing the pre-crisis and crisis periods. 
6. Conclusion 
The operational autonomy of monetary policy is narrow in the selected 
Central-East European countries – and the range of decisions is even 
narrower under turbulent market conditions. The experiences during the 
crisis in the fall of 2008 underlined that even the former “safe haven” of 
the Czech Republic required FX liquidity trough swap lines, and the 
European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve and the Swiss National Bank 
faced the same problem on a larger scale. 
This paper applied a diagnostic model to explore the phenomena that 
occur in and between markets on extreme trading days. After the rejection 
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of the efficient markets hypothesis, the dynamic, conditional correlations 
of the markets were analysed under extreme and ordinary trading days to 
identify the particular forms of collective market behaviours. 
Maastricht-type convergence between the selected bond markets was 
already missing or had disappeared during 2008 due to the crisis, while 
free-floating currency markets tended to move together without any 
explicit monetary policy goal. Stock markets, as a control variable, tended 
to move together in a different way – correlation increased shortly before 
and during the crisis. The selected markets moved together in a 
significantly different way than before the FED began to reduce its prime 
rate, in conjunction with the ECB’s decision to ease liquidity conditions 
without any change in the policy rate. Free-floating exchange rates 
exhibited that rates were strongly correlated with each other, but these 
trends were also significantly different under the tight and expansionary 
monetary policies of the ECB and FED. Contagions and divergence both 
characterised the currency markets; therefore, investors have to be 
cautious regarding exchange rate risk. Trade relations characterised stock 
market correlations well, but contagion between stock markets was only 
indicated by the Dow Jones Industrial index. 
Yield curves’ long maturities generally reflected long run risk 
premiums and inflation expectations. Individual national currencies make 
it difficult to adapt to downward changes in the principle currencies’ yields 
– even real economies are tied strongly together through trade, corporate 
ownership and the banking sector, and the primary goal of monetary 
policy is the same and institutions are harmonised. The Czech, Hungarian 
and Polish bond and currency markets generally had to contend with 
loosening connections during difficult times: shocks affected them to a 
greater extent, while monetary activism was poorly implemented. The 
monetary autonomy of these countries will not decline after they adopt the 
euro in the future because this autonomy is also narrow in the present, and 
its maintenance requires expensive programmes and collaborations. 
Inflation-targeting monetary policy in the CEE was able to reduce inflation 
in all of the sample countries, but it was far from effective in reducing the 
probability of a banking crisis or bond market noise – due to its inability to 
influence the common lending channels between the euro zone headquarters 
and CEE subsidiaries of the regional banks. Therefore, we can conclude that 
inflation-targeting monetary policies have to be maintained in the region, but 
the free movement of capital and financial innovations requires that central 
banks increase their institutional capacities both in terms of financial 
stabilisation and their regional cooperation. 
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